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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Plaintiff Doreen Johnson's appeal is from a final judgment 
of the Sixth Judicial District Court/ Sanpete County. Doreen 
Johnson filed her appeal in this court. On its own motion this 
court transferred the appeal to the Utah Supreme Court pursuant 
to Rule 44/ Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
The Supreme Court assigned the case back to this court 
pursuant to its statutory pour-over authority/ Utah Code Ann. § 
78-2-2(4). 
This court has jurisdiction over cases assigned to it by the 
Utah Supreme Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k). 
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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The sole issue is whether a triable issue of material fact 
exists which precluded the trial court from entering summary 
judgment for appellees on the ground that appellant's claims 
against appellees were barred by either the statute of 
limitations for actions for fraud/ Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-26(3)/ 
or the statute of limitations for actions to set aside a 
fraudulent conveyance/ Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-10/ or the statute 
of frauds relating to interests in real property/ Utah Code Ann. 
§ 25-5-1. 
Upon review of the grant of a summary judgment/ this court 
will look at the facts and inferences to be drawn therefrom in 
the light most favorable to the losing party. Webster v. Sill/ 
675 P.2d 1170, 1172 (Utah 1983). Since, by definition, summary 
judgment does not resolve factual issues, when a party challenges 
a summary judgment, this court reviews the trial court's legal 
conclusions supporting the grant of summary judgment for 
correctness, according them no particular deference. Allen v. 
Ortez, 802 P.2d 1307, 1309 (Utah 1990). 
However, since this court's review of a summary judgment is 
essentially "de novo" (except that this court is limited to a 
review of the record established in the trial court), when more 
than one ground is advanced in support of summary judgment, as 
was the case in this action, this court should review each 
advanced ground and apply the well-established rule that a 
judgment may be affirmed on any proper ground, even if the proper 
ground was not the one relied upon by the trial court. Bill Nay 
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& Sons Excavating v. Neeley Const. Co,/ 677 P.2d 1120 (Utah 
1984). Likewise/ if a grant of summary judgment was proper/ but 
the trial court applied an erroneous standard in ruling on the 
summary judgment motion/ this court may affirm the trial court's 
decision. City Elec. v. Industrial Indem. Co./ 683 P.2d 1053 
(Utah 1984). To hold otherwise would result in the needless 
remand of cases in which summary judgment was proper on the 
record before the trial court and the Court of Appeals. If this 
court were to identify a ground upon which the trial court should 
have granted summary judgment but did not because the trial court 
either relied on an improper ground or applied an erroneous 
standard in ruling on the summary judgment motion/ and the case 
was remanded to the trial court/ the moving party would merely 
move again for summary judgment and the now-enlightened trial 
court judge would again grant summary judgment on the proper 
ground or after applying the correct standard. Such a procedure 
would constitute a waste of judicial resources. 
In short/ when an appellee advanced a sufficient ground for 
a summary judgment in the trial court/ this court should be no 
more reluctant to affirm that summary judgment even if the trial 
court based its ruling on an insufficient ground or on an 
erroneous standard/ than this court would be to find that a trial 
court erroneously denied a meritorious motion for summary 
judgment. 
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RULES AND STATUTES TO BE INTERPRETED 
Appellees submit that appellant's claims against them were 
barred by either the statute of limitations relating to causes of 
action for fraud, Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-26(3), the statute of 
limitations relating to causes of action to set aside a 
fraudulent conveyance, Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-10, or the statute 
of frauds relating to interests in real property, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 25-5-1. Those statutes are quoted verbatim: 
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-1. Estate or interest in real property. 
No estate or interest in real property, other than 
leases for a term not exceeding one year, nor any trust or 
power over or concerning real property or in any manner 
relating thereto, shall be created, granted, assigned, 
surrendered or declared otherwise than by act or operation 
of law, or by deed or conveyance in writing subscribed by 
the party creating, granting, assigning, surrendering or 
declaring the same, or by his lawful agent thereunto 
authorized by writing. 
Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-10. Claim for relief - Time limits. 
A claim for relief or cause of action regarding a 
fraudulent transfer or obligation under this chapter is 
extinguished unless action is brought: 
(1) under Subsection 25-6-5(1)(a), within four 
years after the transfer was made or the obligation 
was incurred or, if later, within one year after the 
transfer or obligation was or could reasonably have 
been discovered by the claimant; 
(2) under Subsection 25-6-5(1)(b) or 25-6-6(1), 
within four years after the transfer was made or the 
obligation was incurred; or 
(3) under Subsection 25-6-6(2), within one year 
after the transfer was made or the obligation was 
incurred. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-1. Time for commencement of actions 
generally. 
Civil actions may be commenced only within the periods 
prescribed in this chapter, after the cause of action has 
accrued/ except in specific cases where a different 
limitation is prescribed by statute. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-26(3). Within three years. 
Within three years: 
(3) An action for relief on the ground of fraud or 
mistake; except that the cause of action does not accrue 
until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts 
constituting the fraud or mistake. 
Because this appeal requires determining whether a summary 
judgment was properly granted/ a copy of Rule 56/ Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure/ is included in its entirety in the addendum to 
this Appellees1 Brief. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
On April 15/ 1991 appellees Reynold Q. Johnson/ Sr. and 
Mildred Johnson filed an action in unlawful detainer in the Sixth 
Circuit Court/ Sanpete County/ against appellant Doreen Johnson/ 
alleging that she was a tenant at will of the property at 390 
North Main in Manti/ Utah and was in unlawful detainer of that 
property. The case number was 91-CV-1581. 
On August 15/ 1991 appellant filed this action to quiet 
title to the same property, alleging that her former husband, 
Reynold Q. Johnson, Jr., had defrauded her out of any interest in 
the property during the course of their divorce action in 1985. 
Appellant added causes of action against her former husband to 
modify the divorce decree. However, Reynold Q. Johnson, Jr. was 
never served in this action and has not appeared. 
The appellees1 circuit court unlawful detainer action was 
consolidated with this action (R. 57), and effectively subsumed 
into this action, since the issue—ownership of the property—was 
the same in both cases. 
Course of Proceedings 
Doreen Johnson filed her action, entitled Verified Petition 
for Modification of Decree of Divorce, on August 15, 1991 (R. 59-
65). She filed an amended petition on September 3, 1991 (R. 66-
74), and appellees filed their answer to the amended petition on 
October 8, 1991 (R. 76-79). 
After taking appellant's deposition, appellees moved for 
summary judgment on March 26, 1992 (R. 111). In support of the 
& 
summary judgment motion/ appellees submitted a memorandum 
(beginning at R. 114) accompanied by pages 3 through 25 of the 
transcript of appellant's deposition testimony (beginning at R. 
123), the affidavit of Reynold Q. Johnson Jr. (R. 12-15), the 
affidavit of Reynold Q. Johnson/ Sr. (R. 23-25)/ and exhibits 
attached to those affidavits. 
Doreen Johnson did not file a memorandum in opposition to 
the summary judgment motion/ but she did file her affidavit in 
opposition to the summary judgment motion on April 15/ 1992 (R. 
150). A copy of the affidavit was not served on appellees1 
attorney at that time. Instead/ it was hand delivered to him on 
April 29/ 1992. After twice being set for hearing and continued/ 
the motion was finally heard on May 20/ 1992. 
Hearing on the motion took place/ arguments were presented/ 
appellees1 attorney orally objected to much of appellants 
affidavit (R.T. 20:24-24:11) on the grounds that much of the 
factual assertions contained therein were either hearsay or 
statements of "ultimate fact" for which no subsidiary facts were 
stated to provide a foundation for the "ultimate facts" alleged/ 
and the court took the motion under advisement. 
On June 12, 1992 the trial court issued its minute order (R. 
210-214)/ granting the motion for summary judgment. The court 
entered its Order Granting Motion for Summary Judgment/ Summary 
Judgment/ and Order of Restitution (R. 215-217) on July 8, 1992. 
Doreen Johnson filed a Notice of Appeal (R. 225) from the summary 
judgment. 
7 
RELEVANT FACTS 
The affidavits, exhibits thereto, and deposition testimony 
presented in support of appellees1 summary judgment motion 
established the following facts which appellees contend are 
undisputed: 
1. On June 29, 1984 Reynold Q. Johnson Jr. received a 
warranty deed from Sterling Potter and Mariella Potter, as 
trustees of the Sterling Potter Family Trust to the property at 
390 North Main, Manti, Utah. The warranty deed was recorded in 
the office of the Sanpete County Recorder on July 2, 1984. 
(Affidavit of Reynold Q. Johnson Jr. and deed attached as an 
exhibit thereto, R. 12-15). 
2. At the time Reynold Q. Johnson Jr. acquired that 
property, he and appellant were married but separated. (R. 13). 
3. On July 13, 1984 Reynold Q. Johnson Jr. quit-claimed the 
same property to his parents, the appellees herein, as joint 
tenants. (Exhibit to affidavit of Reynold Q. Johnson Sr., R. 
25). 
4. Reynold Q. Johnson Jr. filed for divorce from appellant 
in August 1984, after he had quit-claimed the Manti property to 
appellees. (R. 13). 
5. The quit-claim deed from Reynold Q. Johnson Jr. to 
appellees was recorded on November 2, 1984 in the office of the 
Sanpete County Recorder. (R. 13, 23, 25). 
6. Appellant moved into the house on the property on June 
23, 1985. (Deposition of Doreen Johnson, 4:6-8; R. 124). Even 
before moving into the house, appellant had been at the property 
ft 
while her Reynold Q. Johnson Jr. was "fixing it up." (Deposition 
of Doreen Johnson, 10:18-25; R. 130). 
7. Reynold Q. Johnson Jr. became divorced from appellant on 
July 19/ 1985. (R. 13). 
8. Appellant has continuously lived in the house on the 
subject property since June 23/ 1985/ except for several months 
between the end of 1985 and May or June of 1986 when she lived in 
and managed an apartment house in Ogden at her ex-husbandfs 
request. (Doreen Johnson deposition/ 4:12-24; R. 124). 
9. Appellant knew that her divorce was not final when she 
moved into the hosue on the subject property. (Doreen Johnson 
deposition/ 11:8-13; R. 131). 
10. On April 12/ 1985 appellant signed a stipulation in her 
divorce action by which she agreed to accept an office building 
in Mount Pleasant. By its terms the stipulation awards her no 
interest in any other real property. (Exhibit 1 to Doreen 
Johnson deposition). Appellant read "some" of the stipulation 
before signing it. (Doreen Johnson deposition/ 15:12-13; R. 
135). Appellant received a photocopy of the signed stipulation 
in the mail in "July or so" of 1985 when Reynold Q. Johnson III 
was still an infant. (Doreen Johnson deposition/ 16:11-17:7; R. 
136-137). Reynold Q. Johnson III was born three days before 
appellant moved into the house on the subject property on June 
23, 1985. (Doreen Johnson deposition/ 4:6-10; R. 124). 
11. Appellant read the stipulation after receiving the 
photocopy in the mail. (Doreen Johnson deposition/ 17:20-22; R. 
137). 
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12. Appellant was represented by attorney Paul Frischknecht 
during the divorce action. (Doreen Johnson deposition, 12:14-15; 
R. 132). 
13. From the time she moved into the house on the subject 
property on June 23/ 1985 until being served with the unlawful 
detainer action brought in the Circuit Court by appellees, 
appellant never discussed the ownership of the property with her 
former husband. (Doreen Johnson deposition, 22:4-16; R. 142). 
14. When she first moved into the home on the property/ 
appellant gave Reynold Q. Johnson Jr. money to stay in the home. 
(Doreen Johnson deposition, 23:12-25:23; R. 143-145). Reynold Q. 
Johnson Jr. told appellant that his dad (appellee Reynold Q. 
Johnson Sr.) owned the house and wanted $240 per month for rent. 
(Doreen Johnson deposition, 25:5-11; R. 145). 
15. Appellant does not claim to have a deed that gives her 
title to the property. (Doreen Johnson deposition, 21:4-6; R. 
141). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
As it relates to appellees, appellant Doreen Johnson's 
Amended Verified Petition for Modification of Decree of Divorce 
claims generally that she is the "equitable owner" of the 
property at 390 North Main Street, Manti, Utah because her ex-
husband, Reynold Q. Johnson Jr., defrauded her out of an interest 
in the property during the divorce action between her and Johnson 
Jr. by not telling her about his interest in that property during 
the divorce action, and that appellees colluded and conspired to 
deprive her of an interest in the property, apparantly by 
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accepting title to the property from their son. She asked that 
she be awarded "all right/ title and interest" to the property. 
(R. 66-74). 
Because she waited more than six years after she was first 
aware that either her ex-husband or his parents claimed to own 
the property/ and because the deed by which her ex-husband 
acquired title to the property and the deed by which he granted 
the property to appellees were both recorded/ any claim she might 
have to the property is barred by the three-year limitation 
period for bringing an action for relief on the ground of fraud/ 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-26(3)/ or by the four-year limitation 
period for bringing an action to set aside a fraudulent 
conveyance. Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-10(1). 
Appellant's claim of equitable ownership is also barred by 
the statute of frauds relating to interests in real property/ 
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-1. 
Appellant's affidavit in opposition to appellee's summary 
judgment motion did not contain admissible facts sufficient to 
create a triable issue of material fact. Her argument that her 
cause of action did not accrue until within three years of 
bringing her action by reason of her failure to discover facts 
constituting fraud is without merit. As a matter of law 
appellant had knowledge of all the facts she needed to discover 
the existence of any fraud/ had she been diligent in making use 
of those facts. Further/ appellant's affidavit consisted/ in 
large part/ of inadmissible evidence to which appellees 
interposed adequate and appropriate objections. 
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Appellant's claim that she should be awarded attorney fees 
on appeal because appellees1 summary judgment motion and their 
defense of this appeal are frivolous is unsupported by citation 
to any authority. Appellant's attorney fee argument is itself 
without merit and frivolous. 
ARGUMENT 
A. 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT APPELLANT'S 
FRAUD CLAIM WAS BARRED BY UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-26(3) 
In support of their summary judgment motion/ appellees 
presented evidence of the following facts: 
On June 29/ 1984 Reynold Q. Johnson Jr. obtained title to 
residential property in Manti/ Utah. Two weeks later/ on July 
13/ 1984/ Johnson Jr. quit-claimed the property to his parents/ 
appellees herein. The quit-claim deed was recorded on November 
2, 1984. 
In August/ 1984 Johnson Jr. commenced a divorce act6ion 
against his wife/ appellant herein. On June 23/ 1985/ more than 
seven months after parting with title to the Manti property/ 
Johnson Jr. moved appellant into the home on the property. At 
that time the divorce was not yet final. Johnson Jr. told 
appellant that the property belonged to his parents and she 
needed to pay $240 per month to stay in the house. 
1. Appellant submitted an affidavit in opposition to the 
summary judgment motion but none of the facts set forth in 
appellees' motion were contravened by the affidavit. 
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Except for a period of months from near the end of 1985 
until May or June of 1986 when Johnson Jr. moved appellant to an 
apartment house in Ogden which she managed/ appellant has lived 
in the home in Manti. 
On April 16/ 1991/ almost six years after she first moved 
into the house/ appellant was served by appellees with an action 
in unlawful detainer. (R. 1 [Complaint]/ 3-4 [Summons and Return 
of Service]). Only thereafter/ on August 15/ 1991/ more than six 
years after she first moved into the house (and more than five 
years after moving back into the house) did appellant file the 
instant action (R. 59) alleging that she was defrauded of an 
interest in the house by Johnson Jr. and that she was the 
"equitable" owner of the house and property. 
The trial court correctly granted appellee's summary 
judgment motion on the ground that appellant's equitable 
ownership claim was barred by the statute of limitations for 
actions for fraud, Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-26(3). 
Even assuming that appellant's ex-husband/ Johnson Jr./ 
defrauded her out of an interest in the subject property by not 
disclosing his purchase of the property during the marriage or by 
quit-claiming title to the property to his parents before filing 
for divorce, any claim to establish an ownership interest in the 
property by reason of such fraud was barred by the three-year 
limitation period specified in section 78-12-26(3). 
Section 78-12-26(3) provides that an action for relief on 
the ground of fraud must be brought within three years; except 
that the cause of action in such case does not accrue until the 
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discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting fraud. 
The "discovery" rule does not aid appellant in this case. The 
possession of all information necessary to discover fraud 
satisfies the requirement that the plaintiff be aware of the 
fraud. Horn v. Daniel/ 315 F.2d 471 (10th Cir. 1962). That is, 
the three years to bring an action for fraud begins from when the 
facts constituting the fraud are or should have been discovered. 
Richardson v. MacArthur/ 451 F.2d 35 (10th Cir. 1971). In 
discussing a plaintiff's fraud claim in Gibson v. Jensen/ 48 Utah 
244, 158 P. 426 (1916), the Supreme Court stated: 
It was not necessary for her to be informed of all the 
details. [Citation]. If she was made aware of the 
principal or controlling facts, it was sufficient. By that 
we mean it was sufficient if she was fully informed of such 
facts as would put a person of ordinary intelligence and 
prudence upon inquiry. If she was so informed, then she had 
all the information contemplated by the statute [of limita-
tions for actions for fraud]. 158 P. at 427. 
Plaintiff's deposition testimony makes it abundantly clear 
that she has been living in the home on the subject property 
since June 23, 1985 knowing that she had no legal interest in the 
property. She acknowledges that she moved into the home on the 
property before her divorce from Johnson Jr. was final. She 
admits that even before she moved into the home, she had been at 
the property when her ex-husband was "fixing it up." She admits 
that she received and read a copy of the stipulation she signed 
in the divorce action in July or August 1985. That stipulation 
clearly provides that the only real property she was to be 
awarded was an office building in Mount Pleasant. 
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Perhaps most significantly/ appellant admits that after she 
moved into the home/ her ex-husband came to the property on more 
than one occasion, told her that his father owned the property, 
and demanded rent. Certainly, within at most a few months after 
moving into the house on the subject property, appellant was 
fully aware that she had been awarded no legal ownership interest 
in the property in the divorce action, that her ex-husband was 
exercising control over the conditions upon which she could live 
there, and that her ex-husband claimed (correctly) that the 
property was owned by appellees. She had all the information she 
needed to conclude that she may have been defrauded out of an 
interest in the property. 
B. 
APPELLANT!S CLAIM TO OWNERSHIP OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY 
IS ALSO TIME-BARRED BY UTAH CODE ANN. § 25-6-10 
If the fraud of which appellant complains is the transfer of 
the property from Reynold Q. Johnson Jr. to appellees, then her 
2 
action is barred by Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-10. Section 25-6-5(1) 
(a) provides as follows: 
(1) A transfer made . . . by a debtor is fraudulent as to a 
creditor, whether the creditor's claim arose before or after 
the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred, if the 
debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation: 
(a) with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any 
creditor of the debtor; . . . 
2. In granting appellees1 summary judgment motion, the trial 
court relied solely on section 78-12-26(3). If this court were 
to conclude that appellantfs action against appellees is not 
barred to section 78-12-26(3), but is barred by section 25-6-10, 
the trial court's judgment should still be affirmed. Bill Nay & 
Sons Excavating v. Neeley Const. Co., 677 P.2d 1120 (Utah 1984). 
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Assuming Reynold Q. Johnson Jr. transferred the subject 
property to appellees to avoid its inclusion in the marital 
estate/ because he knew he was on the verge of filing for 
divorce/ then arguably the transfer was fraudulent/ as defined by 
section 25-6-5(1)(a). Section 25-6-10(1) provides as follows: 
A claim for relief or cause of action regarding a 
fraudulent transfer or obligation under this chapter is 
extinguished unless action is brought: 
(1) under Subsection 25-6-5(1)(a)/ within four years 
after the transfer was made . . . or/ if later/ within one 
year after the transfer . . . was or could reasonably have 
been discovered by the claimant. 
Appellant had constructive notice of the transfer of the 
Manti property since November 2, 1984 when the quit-claim deed 
from Johnson Jr. to appellees was recorded. Utah Code Ann. § 
57-3-2(1) [a properly recorded document imparts notice to all 
persons of its contents]; Smith v. Edwards/ 81 Utah 244, 17 P.2d 
264, 269 (1932) ["If one is charged with notice of the contents, 
he must be charged with notice of the existence of the document 
itself"] . 
It is clear that the status of legal ownership of the 
property "could reasonably have been discovered" by appellant. 
If she had/ at any time after November 2, 1984, developed even an 
inkling of curiosity over the state of legal title she could have 
checked the county recorder's records and found/ not only that 
appellees were legal owners/ but also that they received their 
title by quit-claim deed from her ex-husband. Instead/ appellant 
was content to live in the home knowing she did not have title to 
it and that it had not been awarded to either party in her 
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divorce proceeding/ as long as no one challenged her right to 
stay. 
The present case is somewhat analogous to the facts of Horn 
v. Daniel/ supra/ 315 F.2d 471. In that case Horn commenced an 
action to set aside a deed to mining claims delivered by him to 
Daniel. He alleged that he was fraudulently induced to deliver 
the deed. Daniel knew that Newmont Exploration wished to lease 
and work a group of mining claims/ some of which were held by 
Horn and some by Daniel. Daniel convinced Horn to give him a 
deed to Horn's claims for a small considertion. Horn conveyed 
his claims to Daniel on May 20/ 1957. Daniel then entered into a 
favorable lease of the claims with Newmont. It wasn't until 
October 17/ 1960 that Horn filed suit to set aside the deed to 
Daniel. On appeal from a determination by the District Court 
that Horn's claim was barred by the three-year limitation period 
of section 78-12-26(3)/ the 10th Circuit reviewed the facts which 
Horn was aware of more than three years before filing his action. 
The court noted that: "On October 11 [1957] the Newmont lease 
was recorded and its terms were public." Though not stated 
explicitly/ it appears that the 10th Circuit concluded that—at 
the latest—once the lease between Daniel and Newmont was 
recorded/ the three year period to bring suit for fraud began to 
run. The court held that/ "[t]he possession of all informa-
tion necessary to discover fraud satisfies the requirements of 
the Utah statute." 315 F.2d at 474. 
17 
c. 
APPELLANT'S CLAIM OF EQUITABLE OWNERSHIP OF THE 
SUBJECT PROPERTY IS BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS 
Appellant's claim of equitable ownership of the subject 
property flies in the face of the statute of frauds, Utah Code 
Ann. § 25-5-1. Section 25-5-1 states: "No estate or interest in 
real property, other than leases for a term not exceeding one 
year . . . shall be created, granted, assigned, surrendered or 
declared otherwise than by act or operation of law, or by deed or 
conveyance in writing." 
Appellant has never contended that she has a deed purporting 
to give her any interest in the Manti property. Because she did 
not file a memorandum in opposition to appellees' summary 
judgment motion, appellees can only guess as to why she thinks 
the alleged fraud on the part of appellees' grantor exempts her 
from the requirements of section 25-5-1. 
Application of section 25-5-1 (or either of the statutes of 
limitation discussed above) would not leave appellant without a 
remedy. She is still free to pursue an action for money damages 
against Reynold Q. Johnson Jr., if she really believes there were 
assets other than the Manti property which were hidden away by 
him at the time of the divorce. Application of section 25-5-1 to 
appellant's claim of "equitable ownership" of the property would 
merely preclude her from looking to the property that has been 
owned by appellees for more than eight years to satisfy any 
recovery she might obtain against Johnson Jr. 
18 
D. 
THE AFFIDAVIT FILED BY APPELLANT IN OPPOSITION TO 
APPELLEES1 SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION WAS INSUFFICIENT 
TO RAISE A TRIABLE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT 
In opposition to the summary judgment motion/ appellant 
filed an affidavit, (R. 150). That affidavit did not dispute 
any of the "undisputed facts" set forth in appellees1 memorandum 
in support of their summary judgment motion.^ it did contain 
numerous assertions of fact relating to her claim that Johnson 
Jr. secreted other assets at the time of the divorce. At hearing 
on the summary judgment motion/ appellees objected to many of the 
paragraphs of the affidavit on various grounds. Most of the 
affidavit's assertions were of "ultimate" fact without setting 
forth foundational subsidiary facts/ or were hearsay/ or were in 
violation of the best evidence rule. (R.T. 20:24-24:11). The 
trial court did not rule on the objections but/ in determining 
whether a triable issue of material fact existed/ was entitled to 
ignore inadmissible evidence presented in the affidavit to which 
objections were made. Treloggan v. Treloggan/ 699 P.2d 747 (Utah 
1985); Norton v. Blackham/ 669 P.2d 857 (Utah 1983) [statements 
in an affidavit that are largely conclusory, and would not be 
admissible in evidence/ may not be considered on motion for 
summary judgment]; Walker v. Rocky Mt. Recreation Corp./ 29 Utah 
3. Appellant did not file a memorandum in opposition to the 
motion so/ obviously/ she did not comply with Rule 4-501(2)(b) 
which requires a memorandum in opposition to a motion for summary 
judgment to begin with a section that contains a concise state-
ment of material facts as to which she contends a genuine issue 
exists. 
19 
2d 274, 508 P.2d 538 (1973) [hearsay testimony that would not be 
admissible at trial is insufficient to create a triable issue of 
fact upon motion for summary judgment]. 
Appellees specifically objected to paragraphs 5, 8/ 9, 13 
and 14 of appellant's affidavit. The objection to paragraph 5, 
which claimed that Johnson Jr. "falsely represented to 
[appellant] during the divorce that the only assets of the 
marriage was a building . . . in the city of Mount Pleasant" was 
based on a lack of foundation. The objection to paragraph 8 was 
based on the hearsay nature of the assertions therein: Appellant 
asserted what her attorney told her that attorney Steven Henroid 
told him (based on what Johnson Jr.'s sister told Henroid at a 
deposition). The objections to paragraphs 13 and 14 were also 
made on the basis of a lack of foundation for the assertions made 
therein, because the assertions were of "ultimate facts" only. 
Those paragraphs of appellant's affidavit to which appellees 
did not object were irrelevant to a determination of whether 
appellant's cause of action for fraud relating to the Manti 
property arose within three years of filing her action. They 
relate to her claims that other assets existed at the time of the 
marriage about which she had no knowledge until so informed by 
4. For example, paragraph 14 of appellant's affidavit states: 
"Reynold Q. Johnson/ Jr./ lien to me about the true ownership of 
the residence at 390 North Main Street [in Manti]. He told me 
his parents owned the residence and real property when in fact he 
and I owned it." The assertion that appellant "owned" the 
subject property was clearly an ultimate fact not supported in 
that paragrah or elsewhere in the affidavit by any subsidiary 
facts that would substantiate appellant's ownership claim. 
20 
her attorney. For example/ paragraph 10 of appellant's affidavit 
merely speaks in terms of "several parcels of real property which 
existed . . . at the time of the entry of the Decree of Divorce." 
Paragraph 11 discusses an account at Merrill Lynch/ the funds in 
which may have belonged to Reynold Q. Johnson Jr. The existence 
of such an account is irrelevant to the question whether 
appellant was defrauded of an interest in the Manti property or/ 
if she was/ whether she knew or should have known of that fraud 
more than three years before bringing her action. Paragraph 12 
talks in terms of "residences and real properties" transfered by 
Johnson Jr. to members of his family but/ again, whether 
appellant has a claim against her ex-husband relating to other 
assets is irrelevant to the question whether she has a claim 
against appellees relating to the Manti property. 
Appellant's affidavit totally failed to set forth facts to 
rebut the obvious and undisputed facts that she had lived in the 
Manti property transferred by Johnson Jr. to appellees for more 
than six years, knowing that she had no legal title/ knowing that 
Johnson Jr. had moved her into the home on the property after 
fixing it up himself/ and knowing that he claimed that his 
parents owned the property. The affidavit may have been 
sufficient to create a triable issue about her discovery of the 
existence of other allegedly secreted assets/ if those other 
assets were at issue in this case/ but was totally insufficient 
to create a triable issue as to the applicability of sections 
78-12-26(3) and 25-6-10(3) as they relate to appellant's claim 
that she was defrauded out of an interest in the Manti property. 
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E . 
APPELLANT'S ARGUMENT THAT APPELLEES1 "MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND THE DEFENSE OF THE APPEAL 
IS WITHOUT MERIT AND IS FRIVOLOUS" IS ITSELF 
FRIVOLOUS: APPELLEE SHOULD BE AWARDED THE 
FEES THEY INCUR IN RESPONDING TO THE ARGUMENT 
Appellant's argument/ beginning at page 24 of her brief/ 
that appellees1 summary judgment motion and the defense of her 
appeal were/are without merit and frivolous is itself a frivolous 
argument. 
The trial court obviously did not think the summary judgment 
motion was frivolous or without merit/ since it granted the 
motion. If appellant thought the motion was frivolous he should 
have made that argument to the trial court—not this court. 
Appellant has not cited a single case/ nor have appellees 
found one/ that has ever held that the defense in an appellate 
court of a trial court's judgment can or has been frivolous.^ 
Rule 33/ Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure/ upon which appellant 
relies/ by its very terms only addresses situations in which an 
appeal is taken which is frivolous or interposed for an improper 
purpose. It strikes appellees as especially frivolous for 
appellant to make an argument that defense of the trial court's 
judgment is frivolous and without merit at a time when appellees 
had not yet even filed their brief. 
Appellees respectfully submit that if there should be a Rule 
33 award of costs or attorney fees in this case/ the award should 
5. Counsel for appellees searched unsuccessfully for such a 
case decided under either Rule 33/ Utah Rules of Appellate Pro-
cedure or Rule 38, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
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be in favor of appellees to compensate them for the three-
quarters of an hour their attorney spent researching Rule 33/ 
U.R.A.P./ and Rule 38/ F.R.A.P./ and drafting this portion of 
Appellees1 Brief. 
CONCLUSION 
The undisputed facts before the trial court demonstrated 
clearly that appellant's claims against appellees were brought 
beyond the time limits prescribed by Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-12-26 
(3) and 25-6-10(1). Those undisputed facts also demonstrated 
that appellant had actual and constructive notice of facts which 
should have put her on notice of any fraud on the part of her ex-
husband/ Reynold Q. Johnson Jr./ with regard to the conveyance by 
him to appellees of the property upon which she continues to 
reside. 
In opposition to appellees1 summary judgment motion/ 
appellant offered only her affidavit containing almost 
exclusively hearsay/ conclusory statements lacking foundation/ 
and assertions concerning other assets that might have belonged 
to Johnson Jr. at the time of her divorce from him/ but which 
were totally irrelevant to her claim of ownership of the subject 
property in Manti/ Utah. The affidavit failed to state facts 
sufficient to create a triable issue of material fact as to 
whether her action claiming that she was fraudulently deprived of 
an interest in the Manti property was brought in a timely manner. 
As a matter of law it was not. 
Based on all of the above/ appellees1 Reynold Q. Johnson Sr. 
and Mildred Johnson respectfully submit that the Order Granting 
-)-\ 
Motion for Summary Judgment/ Summary Judgment/ and Order of 
Restitution entered by the trial court should be affirmed. 
Appellees should also be awarded their costs incurred on appeal/ 
together with attorney fees pursuant to Rule 33 incurred in 
responding to appellant!s frivolous/ meritless argument for costs 
and attorney fees. 
lis ay o Dated th] f February/ 1993. 
lwA~ 
:even H. Lybti^rt 
Attorney for Appellees 
OA 
ADDENDUM 
1. Pages 20 through 24, Transcript of Proceedings: Motion 
for Summary Judgment (R.T. 20-24) 
2. Order on Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 210-214) 
3. Order Granting Motion for Summary Judgment/ Summary 
Judgment/ and Order of Restitution (R. 215-217) 
4. Rule 56/ Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF SANPETE, STATE OF UTAH 
DOREEN JOHNSON, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
CASE NO. 9952 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGEMENT 
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 
REYNOLD Q. JOHNSON, JR., 
REYNOLD Q. JOHNSON, SR., and 
MILDRED JOHNSON, 
Defendant. 
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 20th day of May 1992, 
commencing at 10:00 a.m., that the above entitled matter 
came on regularly before the Honorable DAVID L. MOWER, Judge 
of the Sixth Judicial District Court in and for the County 
of Sanpete, State of Utah, at the Sanpete County Courthouse, 
Manti, Utah; 
That on the 19th day of January, 1993, STEVEN H. 
LYBBERT, Counsel for defendants REYNOLD Q. JOHNSON and 
MILDRED JOHNSON in the above entitled action, requested a 
copy of the TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS and that TRANSCRIPT OF 
PROCEEDINGS appears herein as follows: 
J. M. LIDDELL, CSR, RPR 
SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT REPORTER 
SANPETE COUNTY COURTHOUSE 
MANTI, UTAH 84642 
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PAGE 20 
THE COURT: She should have checked it out. 
MR. LYBBERT: She could have checked it out. She 
had the unhindered right to check it out. If she'd—if at 
any time during those years she'd said, "I wonder hew this 
house is titled?" She could have gone. She could have seen 
that it's titled in the name of my clients and that deed 
u/ould have shown that they received title from her 
ex-husband Reynold, Jr. 
THE COURT: And the discovery requirement is not 
actual discovery. It's either that you knew or should have 
known. 
MR. LYBBERT: That's correct. 
THE COURT: And you're saying that there's a 
burden on her to investigate. 
MR. LYBBERT: Yes. There is a burden on her to 
investigate. I mean that's part of the recording. 
THE COURT: That's why they have recorder's 
offices. And if the statute of limitations has expired, 
then she can't make a claim and the title has to rest in the 
recorded owner, which is your clients. 
MR. LYBBERT: Right. Now she's filed an 
affidavit—are we on record? 
THE COURT: We are. 
MR. LYBBERT: Okay. And I'd like to express for 
the record my objection to part of that affidavit. 
10 
PAGE 21 
1 THE COURT: Which one are you talking about? 
2
 MR. BERRY: Well, it's dated April 4th, or 7th, or 
3 9st, something like that, of *92. 
4
 THE COURT: Okay. I have it right here. 
5
 [INDICATED] 
6 MR. LYBBERT: Any other assets t h a t — t h e money in 
7 the Merril/Lynch account that Mr. Berry referred to and any 
8 other parcels of property that she didn't knovu about, that's 
9
 || all irrelevant and fine, if she just recently discovered 
that there were other property or there was money or 
11
 something that she thinks should have been dealt with in 
12
 that divorce that wasn't—she's still got her claim against 
13 her ex-husband among those. But as to this particular 
14 house, in view of the fact that she moved in knowing she 
15 didn't have t i t l e — s h e even testified in her deposition that 
16 one of the things she claims is that h e — o n e of the things 
17 in this affidavit, it says, "He falsely represented to me 
18
 that his parents owned the house." And in f a c t , — 
19
 THE COURT: That was true. 
20
 MR. LYBBERT: — t h a t was true. And she testified 
21 that when she first moved in, her son would come around and 
22 said, "I need money for rent for my parents." And she would 
23 give him money for a couple of months and did that. And she 
24
 stopped paying; he stopped coming around. So, you know, I 
25
 think given all that, she certainly had enough information 
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PAGE 22 
that she should have been alerted that if she claimed an 
ownership interest, that she should have made it a long time 
ago. 
She also testified in her deposition that she came 
around the house before the divorce was final while he was 
fixing it up, so right then and there maybe that should have 
alerted her that he might have an interest in it. And 
finally, she testified that she signed—the divorce was 
decided on the basis of a stipulation that she signed at a 
time when she was represented by Mr. Frischknecht. She 
testified that in July or so of 1985. This would be right 
around or within a month of the divorce being final. 
THE COURT: What paragraph number are you looking 
at? 
MR. LYBBERT: I'm looking at paragraph 10 of my 
statement of undisputed facts. 
THE COURT: Oh, I was looking at the affidavit. 
I'm sorry. 
MR. LYBBERT: Oh, no. Oh, no. I'm referring to 
her deposition. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. LYBBERT: In July or so when Reynold Q. 
Johnson the third was still an infant, and he was born three 
days before she moved into that house, she received a 
photocopy of the signed stipulation in her divorce case and 
PAGE 23 
she read it. So at that point in time, if not sooner, she 
knew that the divorce didn't give her any interest in that 
property. I think when you look at the totality of the 
circumstances, it's clear that if she had a claim for fraud 
against either her ex-husband or her ex-husband's parents, 
it should have been made years ago. The statute's just run* 
She's had the knowledge that she needed to know that she 
ought to delve into the matter further, at least. 
THE COURT: Now you said there were parts of her 
affidavit that you thought were objectionable; why is that? 
MR. LYBBERT: Well read, specifically, paragraph 5 
of her affidavit. The second sentence if says: The 
defendant Reynold Q. Johnson, Jr., has falsely represented 
to me during the course of the proceeding that the only 
assets of the marriage was a building in Mt. Pleasant." I 
object to the term—well, first of all, I think the use of 
the term "falsely" is a conclusion of law, an ultimate fact, 
and there's no foundational facts to base the use of the 
word "falsely". There's no—there's pretty much complete 
lack of foundation as to that whole second sentence in 
paragraph 5. 
THE COURT: Um-hm. 
MR. LYBBERT: I think most of these statements in 
this affidavit lack foundation, and paragraph 8 is entirely 
hearsay. 
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PAGE 24 
I think paragraph 9, which seeks to interpret the 
deposition of Marilyn Rapley, should be stricken on the 
basis of Best Evidence Rule. I object to it on that ground. 
THE COURT: Let me switch to Mr. Berry,— 
MR. LYBBERT: Okay. 
THE COURT: —and let roe get a response from him. 
MR. LYBBERT: I'd also, if I could be real brief, 
I'd also object to paragraphs 13 and 14 on the same basis, 
that they lack foundation and set forth either legal 
conclusions or ultimate statements of fact without any 
foundational back up. 
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Berry, what's the come back 
to the statute of limitations argument? 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE 
BY MR. BERRY: Well, Your Honor, I think it's the 
law is clear that the statute begins to run when she learns 
of the fraud that was committed upon her. She didn't learn 
of the fraud*'until I was appointed by Judge Tibbs and 
investigated it and acquired the documents. It took me 
several months to do so. But I acquired the documents 
regarding the ownership of all the assets that existed 
during the marriage that were transferred just prior—or 
during the divorce proceeding, or just prior to the divorce 
proceeding. She didn't know of these facts until I told her 
of them and I showed her the documents that I actually 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
) SS. 
COUNTY OF SANPETE ) 
REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 
I, JOSEPH M. LIDDELL, CSR, RPRt Official Reporter 
for the Sixth Judicial District Court, County of Sanpete, 
State of Utah, hereby certify that I did transcribe the 
District Court tape record of proceedings held at the time, 
date, and place as set forth herein using computer aided 
transcription; that the foregoing pages, numbered 1-37, 
inclusive, constitute a true, correct and complete 
transcript of my notes as reduced to typewritten form by me 
or under my direction. 
I further certify that I am not an agent, attorney 
or counsel for any of the parties hereto, nor am I 
interested in the outcome thereof. 
IN WITNESS U/HEREOF I have subscribed my name and 
affixed my seal this 3rd day of February 1992. 
'JOSEPH M. LIDDELL, CSR, RPR 
Notary Public in and for the 
State of Utah 
[License No. 219-1801-1] 
My Commission Expires: 
5-6-94 
1 s&zjfcy** 
1 y*>^ "^; TV 
1 *• 
307 West 103 SouHi 
Manti. Utah IAZA2 
My Commission Expires 1 
May 6,1994 
STATS OF UTAH | 
DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SANPETE COUNTY 
Address: 160 North Main Street, Manti, UT 84642 
Telephone: (801) 835-2131 
Doreen Johnson, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Reynold Q. Johnson, Jr., Reynold 
Q. Johnson, Sr., and Mildred 
Johnson, 
Defendant. 
The parties: Reynold Q. Johnson and Mildred Johnson are 
married to each other. They are the parents of Reynold Q. 
Johnson, Jr., who, at one time, was married to Doreen Johnson. 
Reynold, Jr. and Doreen are the parents of six children. 
The lawyers: Andrew B. Berry, Jr. represents Doreen. 
Steven H. Lybbert represents Reynold and Mildred, but not 
Reynold, Jr. 
The facts: In 1984 Reynold, Jr. and Doreen were married 
but separated. 
There is a residence located at 390 North Main Street in 
Manti, Utah. 
The title to that home passed from a grantor to Reynold, 
Jr. by virtue of a deed dated June 29, 1984 and recorded July 
2, 1984. 
ORDER ON MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case number 9952 
0196D 
Johnson vs. Johnson, 9952 
ORDER ON MOTION, Page -2-
Reynold, Jr. conveyed his interest in the home to his 
parents in a deed dated July 13, 1984 and recorded November 21, 
1984. 
In the spring of 1985 Reynold, Jr. or Doreen filed a 
divorce action in the District Court of Salt Lake County. 
Doreen and the children moved into the home in June of 1985. 
The divorce decree was final in November of 1985. It is 
silent as to the home. 
On April 15, 1991 Reynold and Mildred filed a lawsuit in 
the now-abolished Circuit Court asking for court assistance in 
evicting Doreen and for a judgment for unpaid rent and damages. 
Doreen answered and said, in essence, that the home was a 
marital asset whose existence had been hidden from the divorce 
court by Reynold, Jr. and that she had filed an action to 
modify the divorce decree to rectify the problem and to claim 
her share of the asset. 
It turned out that no such action had been filed. However, 
when that was pointed out to her lawyer, an action was filed in 
the District Court on August 15, 1991. It should be noted that 
the action included not only a petition to modify the divorce 
decree but also a quiet title claim against Reynold and 
Mildred. (Although Reynold, Jr. is named as a party, he has 
never been served. Consequently, the Court has no jurisdiction 
over him.) 
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Thereafter, the Circuit Court and the District Court cases 
were consolidated. 
On March 26, 1992 Mr. Lybbert moved the Court for summary 
judgment against Doreen. He said that her claims were barred 
by the statute of frauds or by either of two statutes of 
limitation. The factual support for the motion was provided by 
affidavits and a deposition. 
Mr. Lybbert1s argument, in essence, is either that Doreen 
has no writing of any kind on which to base her claim to the 
land or that she knew or should have known that she was the 
victim of a fraud and waited too long to make any claim for 
relief. 
The response to the motion from Doreen was her affidavit of 
April 4, 1992. 
As expected in any lawsuit, the parties dispute about who 
said what or about the sequence and timing of events, etc. In 
this case, there are disputes about whether the home was 
acquired during the marriage, about whether Doreen knew or 
should have known about certain events, such as the recording 
of certain deeds, about who gave Doreen permission to move into 
the home, etc. 
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However, perhaps the most telling statement in any of the 
affidavits or depositions is one made by Doreen in the last 
paragraph of her affidavit of April 4, 1992: 
I and my childred have resided in the residence 
...Since June, 1985, believing we were renting ... • 
(emphasis added) 
If Doreen believed that she was a tenant, then she can have 
no ownership claim to the home. She cannot be allowed to 
pursue her assertion that she is the owner of any interest 
therein because a person cannot be an owner and a tenant at the 
same time. 
Doreen's statement on April 4,1 1992 belies all her other 
pleadings in which she claims to be an owner or an equitable 
owner of the property. It also lends credence to the 
opposition's claim that she knew about the ownership status of 
the property in June of 1985 and took no action to claim 
anything to the contrary. 
The Motion for Summary Judgment is granted because Doreen's 
claim is barred by the statute of limitations, Section 
78-12-26(3). Mr. Lybbert is directed to prepare an appropriate 
order and to submit it for execution by following Rule 4-504, 
Rules of Judicial Administration. 
Dated: Co / 1^/19* ^ 
David L. Mower 
0196D 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Copies of the above ORDER ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT were 
distributed as follows (M = by mail, P = personal delivery, F 
by Fax): 
Date To whom 
£ / /5~/19?J- D7l] Andrew B. Berry, Jr . 
P.O. Box 600 
Moroni, UT 84646 
/ / /sr/v*9a \}l% Steven H. Lybbert 
45 East Vine S tree t 
Murray, UT 84107 
(/y\,AjL«. ^^Uc^x. 
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STEVEN H. LYBBERT, Bar No. 4187 
DAY & BARNEY 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Reynold Q. Johnson Sr. 
and Mildred Johnson 
45 East Vine Street 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801) 262-6800 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SANPETE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DOREEN JOHNSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
REYNOLD Q. JOHNSON, JR., REYNOLD ] 
Q. JOHNSON, SR., and MILDRED 
JOHNSON, 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 
I SUMMARY JUDGMENT, SUMMARY | JUDGMENT, AND ORDER OF 
i RESTITUTION 
I Case No. 9952 
1 Judge David L. Mower 
The motion for summary judgment filed by defendants Reynold Q. 
Johnson, Sr. and Mildred Johnson came on regularly for hearing before 
The Honorable David L. Mower on May 20, 1992. Plaintiff appeared by 
her attorney, Andrew B. Berry/ Jr. The moving defendants appeared by 
their attorney, Steven H. Lybbert. The court finds as a matter of 
law that plaintiff's claim against the moving defendants is barred by 
the statute of limitations, Utah Code Ann. Sec. 78-12-26(3). Good 
cause appearing, 
IT IS ORDERED that the motion of defendants Reynold Q. Johnson4 
Sr. and Mildred Johnson for summary judgment is granted; and 
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that plaintiff's action be, 
and hereby is, dismissed as to defendant's Reynold Q. Johnson, Sr. 
and Mildred Johnson; and 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that title to the 
property at 390 North Main Street, Manti, Sanpete County, Utah which 
is more particularly described as follows: 
Beginning at the Northwest Corner of Lot 3, Block 97, Plat 
"A11 Manti City Survey, Sanpete County, State of Utah; thence 
East 118.50 feet, thence South 107.25 feet, thence West 50.50 
feet, thence North 37.00 feet, thence West 68.00 feet, thence 
North 70.25 feet to beginning, containing 0.23 of an acre, 
more or less. 
is quieted in Reynold Q. Johnson, Sr. and Mildred Johnson; and 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that possession of the premises at 390 
North Main Street, Manti, Sanpete County, Utah be delivered to said 
defendants or their agent, and that the plaintiff and the 
plaintiff's property (and all persons claiming a right to occupancy 
of said property through plaintiff) be removed from the premises. 
The clerk of the court is directed to issue a Writ of Restitution and 
the Sheriff is directed to execute said Writ of Restitution 
immediately. 
Dated this _J day of Jusfe', 1992. 
4-David L. Mower 
District Judge 
2 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I am employed by the.office of Day & Barney and 
that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing, postage pre-
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Rule 56. Summary judgment 
(a) For claimant A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or 
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the 
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of 
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any 
part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, 
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his 
favor as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least 
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the 
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be 
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in 
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a 
genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule 
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a 
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the 
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if 
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial contro-
versy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It 
shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without sub-
stantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or 
other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the 
action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be 
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Support-
ing and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set 
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirma-
tively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. 
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affida-
vit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affida-
vits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and 
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the 
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or 
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judg-
ment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits 
of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the 
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be 
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such 
other order as is just. 
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(g) Affidavits made in bad faith, Should it appear to the satisfaction of 
the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule 
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall 
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the 
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused 
him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or 
attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
Compiler's Notes. -
Rule 56, F.R.C.P. 
- This rule is similar to Cross-References. — Contempt generally, 
§ 78-7-18, 78-32-1 et seq. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Affidavit. 
—Contents. 
—Corporation. 
—Experts. 
—Inconsistency with deposition. 
—Necessity of opposing affidavits. 
Resting on pleadings. 
—Sufficiency. 
Hearsay and opinion testimony. 
—Superseding pleadings. 
—Unpleaded defenses. 
—Veriftfcd p\e&drag. 
—Waiver of right to contest. 
—When unavailable. 
Exclusive control of facts. 
—Who may make. 
Affirmative defense. 
Answers to interrogatories. 
Appeal. 
—Adversely affected party. 
—Standard of review. 
Attorney's fees. 
Availability of motion. 
Cross-motions. 
Damages. 
Discovery. 
Disputed facts. 
Evidence. 
—Facts considered. 
—Improper evidence. 
—Proof. 
—Weight of testimony. 
Improper party plaintiff. 
Issue of fact. 
—Corporate existence. 
—Deeds. 
—Lease as security. 
Judicial attitude. 
Motion for new trial. 
Motion to dismiss. 
Motion to reconsider. 
Notice. 
—Provision not jurisdictional, 
—Waiver of defect. 
Procedural due process. 
Purpose. 
Summary judgment improper. 
—Damage to insured vehicle. 
—Dispersal of interest. 
—Findings by court. 
—Foreclosure of trust deeds. 
—Fraud or duress. 
—Guardianship. 
—Mortgage note. 
—Negligence. 
—Nonspecific denial of requests for admission. 
—Note. 
—Recovery for goods and services. 
—Stock ownership. 
—Wrongful possession. 
Summary judgment proper. 
—Contract action. 
—Contract terms. 
—Deceit. 
—Jurisdiction. 
—Negligence. 
—Res ipsa loquitur. 
Time for motion. 
Written statement of grounds. 
Cited. 
Affidavit 
—Contents. 
Specific facts are required to show whether 
there is genuine issue for trial. Reagan Out-
door Adv., Inc. v. Lundgren, 692 P.2d 776 
(Utah 1984). 
When a motion for summary judgment is 
made under this rule, the affidavit of an ad-
verse party must contain specific evidentiary 
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for 
trial. Treloggan v. Treloggan, 699 P.2d 747 
(Utah 1985). 
—Corporation. 
Where an affidavit is made by an officer of a 
corporation, it is generally considered to be the 
affidavit of the corporation itself. However, the 
personal knowledge of an agent of the corpora-
tion who is not a corporate officer regarding 
the facts to which he has sworn will generally 
not be presumed, and therefore, the specific 
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